The process of data mining with differential privacy produces results that are affected by two types of noise: sampling noise due to data collection and privacy noise that is designed to prevent the reconstruction of sensitive information. In this paper, we consider the problem of designing confidence intervals for the parameters of a variety of differentially private machine learning models. The algorithms can provide confidence intervals that satisfy differential privacy (as well as the more recently proposed concentrated differential privacy) and can be used with existing differentially private mechanisms that train models using objective perturbation and output perturbation.
INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy [15] is now seen as a gold standard for protecting individual data records while releasing aggregate information such as noisy count queries or parameters of data mining models. There has been a great deal of focus on answering queries and building models using differential privacy but much less focus on quantifying their uncertainty. Uncertainty estimates are needed by data users to understand how much they can trust a query answer or a data mining model.
Uncertainty comes from two sources: uncertainty in the data and uncertainty due to privacy mechanisms. Uncertainty in the data is often referred to as sampling errorthe data are a sample from a larger population (so a different sample could yield different results). Uncertainty due to privacy mechanisms comes from the fact that any useful algorithm that satisfies differential privacy must have randomized behavior. Both must be quantified in an uncertainty estimate.
In the setting we consider, a differentially private algorithm has trained a model and released its parameters. The end user would like to obtain confidence intervals around each parameter. These confidence intervals themselves must satisfy differential privacy. There has been very little work on this topic and, to the best of our knowledge, all of it has focused on linear regression [33, 4] .
On the other hand, differentially private model fitting algorithms such as objective perturbation [10] and output perturbation [10] can train a variety of models, such as logistic regression and SVM, and achieve state-of-the-art (or near state-of-the-art) accuracy on many datasets. However, they do not come with confidence intervals.
In this paper, we propose privacy-preserving algorithms for generating confidence intervals for differentially private models trained by the techniques of Chaudhuri et al. [10] . We provide versions of these algorithms for pure -differential privacy, as well as the recently introduced concentrated differential privacy (zCDP) [7] .
There are three basic steps in our framework. The first is to use either the output or objective perturbation techniques [10] to provide model parameters. In the case of objective perturbation, the result satisfies both -differential privacy as well as 2 
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-zCDP. In the case of output perturbation, the algorithms for differentially privacy and zCDP (concentrated differential privacy) are different. In the second step, we use Taylor's Theorem and the Central Limit Theorem to approximate the randomness in the model coefficients that is due to both the data and the privacy mechanisms. This approximation relies on properties of the data and thus necessitates a third step of estimating them using either differential privacy or zCDP. Thus, the overall privacy budget must be split into two phases: the budget allocated to getting the model parameters and the budget allocated to estimating uncertainty in the parameters.
In our experiments, we verify the accuracy of our confidence intervals and observe that under pure differential privacy, the confidence intervals for models trained with objective perturbation are shorter than those for models trained with output perturbation. However, under concentrated differential privacy, the confidence intervals for output perturbation are much smaller.
Note that the goal of this paper is not to introduce new model fitting algorithms. The goal is to add capabilities for quantifying uncertainty in the model coefficients.
To summarize, our contributions are the following.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides differentially private confidence intervals for models other than linear regression and our work is not limited to any specific model -it works for any model that can be trained using objective perturbation [10] .
• The confidence intervals can be made to satisfy different variations of differential privacy, including pure -differential privacy [15] , zero-mean concentrated differential privacy (zCDP) [7] , and approximate ( , δ)-differential privacy [14] .
• We empirically validate our confidence intervals using a variety of public datasets.
• Finally, we provide a small improvement to the original objective perturbation model fitting technique [10] by improving some of the constants in the algorithm.
We discuss related work in Section 2 and introduce the preliminaries and notation in Section 3. We derive confidence intervals for models trained with objective perturbation in Section 4. We derive confidence intervals for models trained with output perturbation in Section 5. We show how to apply our algorithms to logistic regression and support vector machines in Section 6 and present experiments in Section 7. We present conclusions in Section 8.
RELATED WORK
Differentially private training of data mining models has been extensively studied, for example, in [10, 17, 26, 42, 44, 40, 5, 24, 43, 19, 38, 45, 31, 34, 35, 20, 25, 28, 37] . However, such work provides model parameters without any uncertainty estimates (such as confidence intervals) about the parameters. To the best of our knowledge, the only exceptions are for linear regression [33, 4] .
Chaudhuri et al. [10] studied a general class of models that (without privacy) are trained with empirical risk minimization. They proposed two general approaches, called objective perturbation and output perturbation for training such models with differential privacy. Subsequent work increased the set of models that can be trained [26, 42, 44, 43, 40] . Kifer et al. [26] extended the algorithm of [10] by removing some differentiability requirements and allowing constraints in model training. Yu et al. [42] solved the problem of differentially private penalized logistic regression with elastic-net regularization by extending the objective perturbation technique to any convex penalty function. Zhang et al. [44] proposed the functional mechanism, which approximates models by polynomials. Subsequently, Zhang et al. [43] proposed a general solution based on genetic algorithms and a novel random perturbation technique called the enhanced exponential mechanism. Wu et al. [40] proposed another output perturbation technique for learning tasks with convex and Lipschitz loss functions on a bounded domain. They relaxed the condition of differentiable loss functions in [10] . However, we found that when both methods are applicable, the noise added by the output perturbation technique of Wu et al. [40] is generally larger than the noise added by the output perturbation technique of Chaudhuri et al. [10] .
High dimensional regression problems were also studied in [5, 24] . Bassily et al. [5] proposed new algorithms for the private convex ERM problem when the loss function is only Lipschitz and the domain of the optimization is bounded. They also proposed separate algorithms when the loss function is also strongly convex. They propose algorithms for both pure and approximate differential privacy. Kasiviswanathan and Jin [24] improved the worst-case risk bounds of Bassily et al. [5] under differential privacy with access to full data. Moreover, with access to only the projected data and the projection matrix, they derived the excess risk bounds for generalized linear loss functions.
There has been some work on quantifying the uncertainty for differentially private models, mostly in the form of confidence intervals and hypothesis testing.
Differentially private hypothesis testing has been studied in [36, 41, 39, 18, 30, 22, 8, 3] . Uhler et al. [36] and Yu et al. [41] conducted differentially private independence testing through χ 2 -tests with output perturbation, and adjusted the asymptotic distribution used to compute p-values. Using input perturbation, Wang et al. [39] , and later independently Gaboardi et al. [18] proposed differentially private hypothesis testing for independence and goodness of fit. Kifer and Rogers [30] later proposed new test statistics for chi-squared testing that are more compatible with privacy noise. Kakizaki et al. [22] proposed the unit circle mechanism for independence testing on 2 × 2 tables with known marginal sums. Cai et al. [8] studied the sample complexity to conduct differentially private goodness of fit test with guaranteed type I and II errors. Later work by Acharya et al. [3] derived the upper and lower bounds on the sample complexity for goodness of fit and closeness testing under ( , δ)-differential privacy.
Providing diagnostics for differentially private regression analysis was studied in [12] , where Chen et al. designed differentially private algorithms to construct residual plots for linear regression and receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves for logistic regression.
Work on differentially private confidence intervals includes [13, 33, 23] . D'Orazio et al. [13] and Karwa and Vadhan [23] did not study models, instead they constructed differentially private confidence intervals for a mean [23] and the difference of two means [13] . In the context of model coefficients, Sheffet [33] studied ( , δ)-differentially private Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) and generated confidence intervals for the parameters. Barrientos et al. [4] used differential privacy to quantify the uncertainty of the coefficients of differentially private linear regression models. They generated differentially private t statistics for each coefficient.
Thus the closest work related to ours is Sheffet [33] and Barrientos et al. [4] . While their work only targets linear regression, our work targets any models that can be trained under the objective perturbation and output perturbation techniques of Chaudhuri et al. [10] , which include many models such as logistic regression and SVM, but excludes linear regression.
To obtain confidence intervals, we also need to privately estimate second order matrices from the data. Perturbing second order matrices for data are common in privacypreserving principal component analysis (PCA). Chaudhuri et al. proposed to perturb the second order matrices with the exponential mechanism to achieve differential privacy in [11] . With the SuLQ framework [6] , Blum et al. added Gaussian noise to the second moment matrix and used it in the PCA to protect a notion of ( , δ, T )-Privacy. Jiang et al. [21] studied the problem of publishing differentially private second order matrices by adding proper Laplace or Wishart noise. Dwork et al. worked on projecting the second moment matrix of data into the low dimensional space using the notion of approximate differential privacy in [16] . Later in [32] , Sheffet also discussed three techniques to get the second moment matrix while preserving the approximate differential privacy, with the matrices being positivedefinite.
Due to the structure of the matrices needed by our techniques, a spherical version of the Laplace Mechanism, introduced in the objective perturbation method [10] to achieve differential privacy, or the Gaussian Mechanism [7] to achieve zero-mean concentrated differential privacy [7] , are most appropriate.
PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
In this section, we introduce notation used in the paper and then review the background of differential privacy and its variants, empirical risk minimization, and its applications to logistic regression and support vector machines.
Let D = {( x1, y1), . . . , ( xn, yn)} be a set of n records. Each record i has a d-dimensional vector xi of real numbers known as a feature vector and each yi ∈ {−1, 1} is called the target. Following [10] , we require that each record is normalized so that || xi||2 = 1.
Differential Privacy
Definition 1. (Differential Privacy [15] ). Given an > 0 and δ ≥ 0, a randomized mechanism M satisfies ( , δ)-differential privacy if for all pairs of databases D, D differing on the value of a record, and all V ⊆ range(M),
When δ = 0, we refer to it as both -differential privacy and pure differential privacy. When δ > 0, we refer to it as both ( , δ)-differential privacy and approximate differential privacy. Another relaxation of differential privacy is known as zero-mean concentrated differential privacy, or ρ-zCDP for short.
Definition 2. (Zero-Concentrated Differential Privacy (zCDP) [7] ). A randomized mechanism M satisfies ρ-zeroconcentrated differential privacy (i.e., ρ-zCDP) if for all pairs of databases D and D that differ on the value of a single record and all α ∈ (1, ∞),
ρ-zCDP is weaker than pure differential privacy and stronger than approximate differential privacy. The following results make the relations between them precise.
Thus, we only focus on pure differential privacy and ρ-zCDP in this paper. All ρ-zCDP algorithms can be converted into algorithms for approximate differential privacy using Proposition 2.
The algorithms studied in this paper rely on the concept of L2 sensitivity: Definition 3. (L2-Sensitivity [10, 7] ). The L2-sensitivity for a (scalar-or vector-valued) function f is
for all pairs of databases D, D ∈ domain(f ) differing on the value of at most one entry.
For example, the L2 sensitivity is used to set the variance of the Gaussian Mechanism for ρ-zCDP. Proposition 3. (Gaussian Mechanism [7] ). Let f be a vector-valued function (whose output is a vector of dimension d) with L2 sensitivity ∆2(f ).
Both differential privacy and ρ-zCDP are invariant under post-processing [15, 7] . That is, if a mechanism M satisfies -differential privacy (resp., ρ-zCDP), and if A is any algorithm whose input is the output of M, then the composite algorithm, which first runs M on the input data and then runs A on the result satisfies -differential privacy (resp., ρ-zCDP).
Another useful property of these definitions is composition, which allows the privacy parameter of a complicated algorithm be derived from the privacy parameters of its subcomponents.
Proposition 4. (Composition [15, 7] ). Let M be a randomized mechanism that satisfies -differential privacy (resp., ρ-zCDP) and M be a randomized mechanism that satisfies -differential privacy (resp., ρ -zCDP). Then the composite algorithm
Empirical Risk Minimization
Empirical risk minimization is a common way of training data mining models. There is an assumption that the dataset D = {( x1, y1), . . . , ( xn, yn)} is independently sampled from some unknown distribution F0. In this setting, the model has a parameter vector θ and a prediction function g. Its prediction for y is g( x, θ).
To train the model, in the setting assumed by Chaudhuri et al. [10] , one specifies a loss function in the form of f ( x, y, θ) = f (yθ T · x), and finds the θ that minimizes the empirical risk:
(1)
To satisfy differential privacy, Chaudhuri et al. [10] , proposed the objective perturbation technique to add noise to the objective function and then produce minimizer of the perturbed objective:
where β is a zero-mean random variable with density
where u is the normalizing constant, and γ depends on the privacy budget and the L2-sensitivity of Ln(·). Their proof of privacy depends on the concept of strong convexity:
d is said to be λ-strongly convex if for all α ∈ (0, 1), θ and η,
Logistic Regression and SVM
In the paper, we will work with the applications of logistic regression and support vector machines (SVM) 1 . In logistic regression, the goal is to predict P (y = 1 | x) and this is done by modeling P (Y = 1 | x) = S(θ · x), where S is the sigmoid function:
Logistic regression is trained in the ERM framework using the loss function
In support vector machines, the prediction for y is 1 if θ · x ≥ 0 and is −1 otherwise. To train it in the ERM framework, we will use the Huberized hinge Loss [9] , defined as follows:
where z = yθ · x and where h is a fixed constant [9] .
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR OBJEC-TIVE PERTURBATION
In this section, we show how to obtain confidence intervals for models trained by objective perturbation [10] . For completeness, we present a slightly improved version of the algorithm in Section 4.1 and then derive the confidence interval algorithm in Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4.
Objective Perturbation
The objective perturbation algorithm modifies the ERM framework by randomly drawing a noise vector β from a spherical version of the Laplace distribution (see Equation 3 ). Then, instead of minimizing the original ERM objective and then minimizes it with respect to θ. The version of the techniques shown in Algorithm 1 slightly differs from the original [10] in the first line, allowing it to use less noise.
2 Sample a d-dimensional vector β with density from Equation 3 with γ = /2
If the loss function f (·) is convex and doubly differentiable, with |f (·)| ≤ 1 and |f (·)| ≤ t, then Algorithm 1 satisfies -differential privacy whenever all the feature vectors xi have || xi||2 ≤ 1. 1 We use these two applications as examples, but our algorithms are not restricted to them.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A. In order to achieve ρ-zCDP, we use Proposition 1 to conclude that the algorithm satisfies 
Confidence Intervals
In this section, we describe one of our main contributions -the construction of confidence intervals for objective per-
Letθ be the privacy preserving parameters output by the objective perturbation algorithm. Let θ0 be the non-private solution we would get if we had infinite data (i.e. the true parameter vector). Since the noise in Algorithm 1 is divided by n, then θ0 is also the privacy-preserving solution one would obtain with infinite data and E[∇Jn(θ0, D)] = 0, where the expectation is taken over the data and β (note that β has 0 mean).
Expanding the Taylor series of Jn aroundθ and noting that the gradient of Jn atθ is 0 by construction (sinceθ minimizes Jn), we have 
If the Hessian and covariance matrices were known, we could combine the two approximations for ∇Jn(θ0) as follows. Let G be a random variable with distribution N ( 0, Σ).
whereβ is a fresh random variable that follows the same distribution as β. However, since the Hessian and the covariance matrix of G, are unknown, we will need to obtain privacy preserving estimatesH andG. Substituting these privacy-preserving estimates and performing simple algebra, we obtain:
(whereG = N ( 0,Σ)). We next discuss how to estimate the Hessian and covariance matrix and how to use them with Equation 4 to produce confidence intervals for each element of θ0.
Computations of the Hessian and Covariance Matrix
If privacy was not a concern, the Hessian would be computed as:
and the covariance matrix Σ would be estimated as:
where second-to-last step is obtained from the fact that E[∇Jn(θ0)] = 0 from which it follows that E[∇f ( x, y, θ0)] + 2cθ0 = 0. However, since privacy is indeed a concern, we need to obtain estimates of the Hessian and covariance matrix using either -differential privacy or ρ-zCDP. The same algorithm works for both matrices and is shown in Algorithm 2.
The algorithm takes the matrix M , which is either the Hessian (computed as in Equation 5) or the covariance matrix (computed as in Equation 6 ). It also takes the L2 sensitivity of these matrices (we show how to compute the sensitivities for logistic regression and SVM in Section 6). It uses the L2 sensitivity to determine the variance of the noise that must be added. 2 The distribution of this noise depends on whether we want to use differential privacy or zCDP.
These resulting noisy matrices might not be symmetric positive-semidefinite (even though the Hessian and covariance matrices must have those properties). Thus we add a postprocessing step to make the matrix symmetric and have all eigenvalues at least 2c. Sample a noise vector η from N 0,
Lemma 1. Algorithm 2 satisfies φ-differential privacy and φ-zCDP.
The proof of Lemma 1 is in Appendix B.
Putting It All Together: Confidence Intervals Generation
The overall algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3. It first splits the privacy budget into 3 pieces φ1, φ2, φ3. Using privacy budget φ1, it runs the objective perturbation algorithm to provide privacy-preserving model parametersθ. Privacy budget φ2 is used to provide a privacy-preserving estimate of the HessianH and privacy budget φ3 is used to provide a privacy preserving estimate of the covariance matrixΣ. Once these quantities are obtained, it can use Equation 4. This equation says that the distribution of θ0 −θ can be approximated by samplingG from N ( 0,Σ),β from Equation 3 and then plugging them into Equation 4 withH instead of the true Hessian. By obtaining many such samples z1, . . . , zm where each zi is a d-dimensional vector (because θ0 andθ are d-dimensional), for each dimension j we take an interval (aj, bj) that covers 1 − α (e.g., 95%) of the zi [j] . Then the estimated confidence interval for
Note that this sampling step is strict postprocessing -never accesses the original data and it only uses privacy preserving estimates from the previous steps. 
, privacy budgets φ1, φ2 and φ3, parameters c, t, f used by objective perturbation (Algorithm 1), the number of postprocessing samples m to generate, confidence level α 1θ ← ObjPerturb(D, φ1, t, c) // calling Algorithm 1
. . , m) with density from Equation 3 with γ = /2 (same γ parameter as used in Algorithm 1) The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix C.
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR OUT-PUT PERTURBATION
In this section, we provide confidence intervals for model parameters learned with output perturbation rather than objective perturbation. Again, we will have algorithms for both differential privacy and zCDP. We will follow similar steps as Section 4 to obtain the intervals.
Output Perturbation
We first review the output perturbation method of Chaudhuri et al. [10] . Then we will explain how to obtain confidence intervals for the resulting parameters in Section 5.2 (recall that they must account for noise due to the data being a sample as well as noise due to privacy).
In output perturbation, the first step is to compute the non-private parametersθ:
and then add noise to them [10] . The L2 sensitivity ofθ is 1/(nc) [10] and so for -differential privacy, they releasê θ +β, where β has the distribution from Equation 3 with parameter γ = nc . To obtain ρ-zCDP one uses the Gaussian Mechanism instead, and samples β from the multivariate normal distribution N 0, 
Confidence Intervals
Now we discuss our main contribution in this section, obtaining confidence intervals for the parameters returned by output perturbation. Recall θ0 is the infinite sample minimizer to Ln(θ) = 1 n n i=1 f ( xi, yi, θ) + c θ 2 2 (i.e. when n → ∞) whileθ is the finite sample minimizer andθ is the privacy preserving output of Algorithm 4 that we get by using privacy budget φ1.
We apply Taylor's theorem aroundθ to ∇Ln(θ0):
As in Section 4, we define G to be the Gaussian N ( 0, Σ), and the formulas for Hessian H[Ln(θ)] (which is equal to H[Jn(θ)]) and covariance matrix Σ are the same as Equations 5 and 6, respectively, from Section 4.2.
Similar to Section 4.2, √ nLn(θ0) follows the N ( 0, Σ) distribution, so we get
whereβ has the same distribution as the β in Algorithm 4. Using the same methods as in Section 4.3, we obtain differentially private estimates for the Hessian using privacy budget φ2 and covariance matrix using privacy budget φ3 (and defineG = N ( 0,Σ)). Plugging those in, we get
Note that this equation says that the difference between θ0 and the privacy preserving estimate is approximately the same as the distribution on the right hand side, which only depends on privacy preserving quantities (and not the original data). For differentially private confidence intervals, as before, we sample many times from the distribution ofG andB and use the right hand side of Equation 8 to obtain approximate samples z1, . . . , zm from the distribution of θ0 − θ. For each j, we find an interval (aj, bj) that contains (1 − α) of the zi[j]. Sinceθ is a privacy preserving estimate, our privacy preserving confidence interval for θ0[j] is (θ + aj,θ + bj).
On the other hand, if we are computing zCDP confidence intervals, the algorithm is much more efficient. In this case bothβ andG are multivariate Gaussians and so their sum is the multivariate Gaussian N ( 0, U ) where
and φ is the privacy budget used in Algorithm 4 to perturb θ. Therefore we could compute the confidence intervals for θ0 directly instead of doing Monte Carlo sampling. For each j, we directly compute the confidence interval for θ0[j] as
where z α/2 is the (1 − α/2)-quantile of the standard normal distribution. The complete algorithm is shown in Algorithm 5. Note that once we have privacy preserving estimates ofθ,H, andΣ using privacy budgets φ1, φ2, φ3, respectively, everything else is post-processing and thus does not affect the privacy cost. 
APPLICATIONS TO LOGISTIC REGRES-SION AND SVM
We now apply our confidence interval algorithms to logistic regression and support vector machines. Both models can be learned by objective and output perturbation [10] . In 
, privacy budgets φ1, φ2 and φ3, regularization coefficient c, the number of samples m, confidence level α.
φ2, c) // calling Algorithm 2 order to apply our confidence interval algorithms, we need to compute the L2 sensitivity of the Hessian and covariance matrices, as those quantities are needed to calibrate the amount of perturbation of those matrices that we need to protect privacy (Algorithm 2).
For logistic regression, the gradient and Hessian are well known:
where S is the sigmoid function. It is also well known that the loss function is convex and doubly differentiable with |f (z)| ≤ 1 and |f (z)| ≤ 1/4. For SVM, it is well-known that the piecewise gradient and Hessian for the Huber loss f Huber (yθ T x) are:
Huber loss is convex and differentiable, and piecewise doublydifferentiable, with |f Huber (z)| ≤ 1 and |f Huber (·)| ≤ 1 2h [10] . Even though the second derivative does not exist at a few isolated points, Chaudhuri et al. [10] proved that objective and output perturbation algorithms for SVM still preserve privacy.
We now derive the L2 sensitivity for the Hessian and the covariance matrix for logistic regression and SVM.
Lemma 2. The L2-sensitivity of the covariance matrix Σ (defined in Equation 6) for logistic regression is at most 2S( θ0 2) 2 /n.
The proof of Lemma 2 is in Appendix E. 
EXPERIMENTS
We run experiments on several real datasets: Adult and KDDCUP99 data sets from [27] , the Banking data set [29] , the IPUMS-US [1] dataset and the IPUMS-BR [2] dataset. Adult [27] is a dataset extracted from the 1994 Census database and contains 30,162 records on demographic information. A common task based on it is predicting whether annual income exceeds $50K. KDDCUP99 [27] is the dataset used for the Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition which contains 4,898,431 records. It contains network traffic data simulated in a military network environment and the goal is to distinguish network attacks. Banking [29] contains 45,211 records on the direct marketing phone calls of a Portuguese banking institution, and is used for predicting whether the client will subscribe a term deposit. US [1] and BR [2] are from IPUMS that provides census and survey data from around the world integrated across time and space. Users can freely choose the data samples and the variables to be used to create data extracts. In the paper, we use the versions from [43] where US has 39,928 records and BR has 38,000 records. The targets for both of them are predicting whether personal income exceeds some thresholds.
All the datasets contain both numerical and categorical attributes. As was done in [10, 43] , following common practice for regression problems, we binarize each categorical attribute so that an attribute with cardinality k becomes k binary attributes. We then standardize each attribute so its maximum attribute value becomes 1 and then normalize each record to ensure its L2 norm is upper bounded by 1. As for the target column, it is mapped to either -1 or 1. After pre-processing, the dimensionality of each dataset is given in Table 1 . To experiment with the sample size and dimensionality, we may extract sub-datasets from those datasets by first randomly permuting the dataset and then taking the first n1 samples and/or the first d1 features from it. We also add a column of ones as the constant feature to each final dataset, and normalize each record again to bound the L2 norm by 1. But the dimensionality d reported with the experimental results is the one before adding the constant feature.
Measures
The quality of confidence intervals is evaluated using two complementary measures, coverage percentage and length. Coverage percentage is the fraction of times they cover the true parameters, so a putative 95% confidence interval should cover the true parameter at least 95% of the time. However, an infinitely long confidence interval can also cover the true parameter at least 95% of the time, so the goal is to evaluate how short the confidence intervals are. We compare the length to a lower bound we call the variability interval -no confidence interval can be shorter than the variability interval. We describe how we measure coverage percentage and compute the variability intervals next. Coverage percentage. For each dataset D, we treat its empirical distribution as the true distribution and the nonprivate model parameters learned on the data as θ0. To simulate the effects of sampling, we create multiple "sampled" datasets D1, . . . , D k by sampling with replacement from the original dataset D. Each such dataset Di is called a bootstrap replicate and there are k = 1, 000 of them. To estimate coverage, for each Di we use our algorithm to compute the privacy-preserving confidence interval θ
for each coordinate j of θ0. The coverage percentage for a parameter θ0[j] is then the fraction of the privacy-preserving confidence intervals that contain θ0[j]. The overall coverage is then the average coverage over all parameters:
where 1 is the indicator function and d is the dimensionality of θ0. Variability Intervals VI. The variability interval directly measures the actual variation in parameter estimate due to sampling noise and due to the algorithm that estimates the parameters (e.g., output perturbation or objective perturbation). This is possible to obtain in controlled experiments. On the other hand, confidence intervals are an estimate (not a direct measurement) of this variability. We obtain variability intervals as follows:
For each dataset D, we treat its empirical distribution as the true distribution and the non-private model parameters learned on the data as θ0. To simulate the effects of sampling, we create multiple "sampled" datasets D1, . . . , Dm by sampling with replacement from the original dataset D.
Each such dataset Di is called a bootstrap replicate and there are m = 10, 000 of them. This simulates variability due to sampling. On each Di we run the privacy-preserving ERM algorithm (either output or objective perturbation) to get the estimateθ (i) . The variability in theseθ (i) is thus solely due to sampling and privacy noise used to create the parameter estimates (with privacy budget φ1) -in other words, it is not affected by the φ2 and φ3 that are used in our confidence interval algorithms. Clearly, any 1 − α confidence interval must therefore be at least as long as the 1 − α variability interval and so the quality of a confidence interval is measured as how long it is compared to the variability interval. Thus we plot average length of confidence intervals vs. average length of variability intervals.
Throughout our experiments, we use α = 0.05, k = 1, 000, m = 10, 000 (recall m is the number of post-processing samples used in Algorithms 3 and 5 to estimate confidence intervals). For simplicity, in the figures, we use DP for differential privacy, zCDP for zero-concentrated differential privacy, CI for confidence interval, VI for variability interval, obj for ERM with objective perturbation, output for ERM with output perturbation, LR for logistic regression and SVM for support vector machines.
In our experimental results, we will report the privacy parameters for differential privacy and ρ for zCDP. To compare differentially private and zCDP algorithms on the same plot, we set ρ = 
Coverage Percentage Experiments
We first check the coverage percentage of the private confidence intervals computed from our algorithms for the applications of logistic regression and SVM. With α = 0.05, the expected coverage is about 0.95. In Tables 2 through 6 , we present the coverage percentage for the private confidence intervals computed from each of our algorithms with varying parameters. That is, we test for both differential privacy and zCDP and we evaluate how good the intervals are for parameters obtained through objective perturbation and output perturbation. We can see that the coverage from our experiments are all close to 0.95, which means the private confidence intervals generated from our methods are valid.
Comparison among the Private Confidence Intervals
We test the performance of the private confidence intervals on the applications of logistic regression and SVM. We will compare the length of our confidence intervals to that of the variability intervals.
We will directly compare different configurations, like intervals using differential privacy vs zCDP, intervals for coefficients obtained through objective perturbation vs. intervals obtained through output perturbation. In all of those cases, we vary various parameters, like the sample size, dimensionality and privacy parameters. When we are varying the dimensionality d, we report the length of the intervals When dimensionality is not being varied, we report the average length of the intervals across all coordinates.
DP vs zCDP with Objective Perturbation ERM
In Figure 1 , we experiment with the different privacy definitions for parameters obtained with objective perturbation. Figure 1 where we vary parameters other than the sample size, zCDP outperforms differential privacy by both average value and variance for length of confidence intervals. This is because zCDP is a relaxation of differential privacy. Moreover, the zCDP confidence intervals perform very well by showing closeness in length to the variability intervals.
DP vs zCDP with Output Perturbation ERM
In Figure 2 , we experiment with the different privacy definitions for parameters obtained with output perturbation. From the figure, we see zCDP outperforms differential privacy with shorter intervals in length as well as smaller variance. The length of each confidence interval is either very close to or only a bit longer than their corresponding variability interval. One interesting phenomenon we notice is that the length of both intervals changes very slowly when we vary the dimensionality for the output perturbation technique with zCDP. This is due to the smaller tails of the Gaussian distribution. But when we get a large amount of data (e.g., when n = 450, 000 from Figures 2a and 2b) , the data overwhelms the noise and reduces the difference between the settings.
Objective vs Output Perturbation with DP
In Figure 3 , we use differential privacy to compare the confidence intervals that are achievable for models trained with objective perturbation against output perturbation. The figure shows that objective perturbation outperforms output perturbation in the length of intervals but also yields slightly larger variances in interval length. Again, when we have enough samples (e.g., when n = 450, 000 in Figures  3a and 3b) , the difference in performance due to different perturbation techniques is almost negligible.
Objective vs Output Perturbation with zCDP
In Figure 4 , we use zCDP and compare the confidence intervals for models learned using objective perturbation and output perturbation based ERM. Except for Figure 4c and Figure 4d , output perturbation outperforms objective perturbation when we protect zCDP. We note that the confidence intervals are close to the variability intervals, but the variability intervals for output perturbation are generally much shorter. For the two exceptions, with increasing dimensionality, the length of intervals with objective perturbation grows, but the length of intervals with output perturbation is almost steady, and there is a cross point for the two methods. Together with the previous findings on d, it seems the dimensionality may add more uncertainty to the performance of the intervals than the other parameters. The effect of increasing sample size is the same as previous results.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed algorithms for generating confidence intervals of differentially private models that are learned using objective and output perturbations. Prior work only obtained confidence intervals for linear regression. Our experiments show that the confidence intervals obtain the desired coverage and provide intervals that are close to the true variability in the parameter coefficients. Future work includes generalizing these techniques to work with other model building algorithms. Privacy-preserving data sharing for genome-wide association studies. 
